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Aspects of the Minnesota
Rule Prohibiting Discovery of
Work-Product and Expert Conclusions
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02 expressly pro-
hibits any pretrial discovery of either an attornzey's
written work-product or an expert's conclusions; non-
written work-product as well as facts observed by an
expert, however, are not covered. The authtor of this
Note compares the Minnesota prohibitions with the
federal, judicially created limitations on discovery in
light of the policies that underlie both. He concludes
that the prohibition of Minnesota Rule 26.02 shomild
only be applied to those areas definitely coming within
its language, but that a more flexible limitation, pat-
terned after the federal rule, might be applied to areas
not expressly covered by Rule 26.02.
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the common-law procedural system there was no right
to inspect relevant documents of an adversary prior to trial.' The
advent of an effective pretrial discovery mechanism was, there-
fore, regarded as one of the foremost innovations of the procedural
system embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' Al-
though all nonprivileged facts relevant to impending litigation
were to be revealed to all interested parties5 production of docu-
ments prepared by attorneys in anticipation of trial that reflected
legal theories or mental processes was often not compelled.4 The
1. Discovery was, however, available in equity proceedings. See MnL.iAn,
THu OLD RnuGEu Aw = Nuw iN Cim FitocEmu 36-39 (1937).
2. See generally Pike, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure
and the Rules of Evidence, 34 Eu,. L. IRuv. 1 (1940); Pike & Willis, The New
FederalDeposiiio.-Discovery Procedure .(pt. 1), 38 CoLur. L. Iluv. 1179 (1938);
Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 30 Mn. L. IIzv.
215 (1937).
3. Not all facts can be discovered, however, even under the federal rules.
For example, confidential business information was held nondiscoverable in
Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 11 FaID. 5062 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
But cf. Seff v. General Outdoor Advertising Co. 11 F.R.D. 597 (NiD. Ohio
1951).
4. See, e.g., Condry v. Buckeye S.S. Co., 4 F.R.D. 310 (Wi). Pa. 1945);
Creden v. Central R.R., 1 F-FUD. 168 (ED.N.Y. 1940); cf. Walling v. Rich-
mond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (Ei).N.Y. 1943).
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United States Supreme Court, in Hickman v. Taylor,' referred
to these documents as an attorney's "work-product" and suggested
that the basis for limiting their discovery was the promotion of
the adversary system. Similar restrictions have been placed by
the federal courts on discovery of the findings or conclusions of
an adversary's expert.0 Both the expert exemption and the work-
product rule represent potentially severe limitations on discovery.
The scope of discovery of both attorney work-product and ex-
pert conclusions has been restricted in Minnesota by explicit
statutory provision rather than by judicial creation. Rule 26.02
of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the pro-
duction for discovery of any "writing obtained or prepared . . .
in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial, or of any
writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories, or . . . the conclusions of an expert,
shall not be required."17 This provision, in contrast to the federal
Hickman rule, precludes discovery of an attorney's written work-
product and conclusions of an expert without regard to good cause.8
Further, Rule 26.02 extends beyond Hickman by expressly pro-
viding not only against discovery of an attorney's writings, but
also against those prepared by the party or his surety, indemnitor,
or agent in anticipation of litigation.' Although the Minnesota
provision apparently was intended to have placed broader re-
5. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
6. See, e.g., E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 28
F.R.D. 237, 239 (D. Del. 1959) (deposition seeking information contained in
calculations, test data, charts and spectra performed by technicians under
counsel's direction disallowed); United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, More or
Less, 18 FAtLD. 195 (D.NM . 1955) (prepared reports and documents contain-
ing the opinions of expert appraisers not compelled under Federal Rule 34).
7. AMnw. R. Civ. P. 26.02. The section Teads as follows:
Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided -by Rule 80.02 or
80.04, the witness may be examined regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party
or to the claim or defense of any other party .... It is not ground
for objection that the testimony will .be inadmissible at the trial if the
testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence. The production or inspection of any writing
obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indem-
nitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial,
or of any writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions, or legal theories, or, except as provided in Rule 85,
the conclusions of an expert, shall not be required.
8. See note 19 infra.
9. The federal rule, although not extending to all the categories covered
by Rule 26.02, is not confined solely to work done by the attorney. See Alit-
strictions on discovery of written work-product than the federal
limitation, 0 the exact relationship between the federal -the
Hickman - rule and Minnesota Rule 26.02 is largely unanswered.
This Note will first examine the rationale underlying the limita-
tions on discovery and then explore the possible applicability of
a Hickman-type rule in Mfinnesota under certain circumstances
with respect to both attorney's work-product and expert's con-
clusions.
11. TRE UNDERLYING RATIONALE
The federal limitation on discovery of an attorney's work-
product, which is apparently inconsistent with the policy of favor-
ing maximum discovery, was at first justified on the ground that
the inquiry would not produce admissible evidence." Although
discovery techniques must appear "reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence,"'-' there is no requirement
that any evidence actually be produced or that the information
produced be admissible; the determinative limitations are only
that the inquiry be both relevant and restricted to nonprivileged
information.'2 Federal courts consequently precluded discovery
aimed at relevant, nonprivileged work-product on the ground
that it fell within the attorney-client privilege 4 Not all docu-
mont v. United States, 177 F.-d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 US. 967(1950). For a discussion of the Hickman rule, see Tolman, Discovery Under
the Fed-ral Rules: Production of Documents and the Work Product of the
Lawyer, 58 CoLum. L. Rav. 498, 508-09 (1958); 41 Mm'x. L. Rav. 823 (1957).
10. Initially, Mmix. R. C. P. 30.02 was to be revised by an insertion of
a provision protecting against undue expense and directing the court to liber-
ally exercise its power to protect the parties and witnesses. Rule 20.02, in
the meantime, was to be revised by requiring that the "examining party may
not inquire as to contents or substance of statements obtained from prospec-
tive witnesses by or on -behalf of another party." 2 YOUNrQuisT & BLACIm,
MnxwasoTA Rus PaicTIcE (Supp. 1962, at 8). This suggestion was deemed
unsatisfactory and Rules 26.02 and 30.02 were later amended to their present
language. The broadly phrased suggestion reflected an absolute immunity, but
did not distinguish between experts and other witnesses or express the pres-
ent concern with written -statements or the "anticipation of litigation or prepa-
ration for trial" requirement. It does, 'however, reflect the complementary
interaction between Rules 30.02 and 26.02.
11. See, e.g., In re Citizens Cas. Co., 3 FAR.D. 171 (S!D.N.Y. 1942); Pop-
pimo v. Jones Store Co., 1 FA). 215 (W-D. Mo. 1940); cf. Kenealy v. Texas
Co., 29 F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b); see Mn-r. I. Crv. P. 26.02.
13. Ibid.; see Curtis v. Loew's Inc., 20 FRD. 444 (D.N.J. 1957).
14. See Hickman v. Taylor, 153 Fa-d 212, 222-1-03 (3d Cir. 1945). But cf.
Dugger v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 5 F.R). 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
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ments prepared for trial, however, can properly be considered
communications between attorney and client.1 Also, a privilege,
unless waived, carries over into trial, but an exemption from dis-
covery applies only to pretrial activities.
While rejecting the previous attempts to justify the limita-
tion, 6 Hickman v. Taylor 7 nonetheless held that materials
constituting an attorney's "work-product" are protected from
discovery,' except that a party can compel production of an
adversary's work-product if he can demonstrate "good cause."' 9
Yet the underlying rationale of the Hickman case has re-
mained uncertain. Relying on the language concerning the pro-
tection of the privacy of an attorney's theories and possible legal
contentions, some federal courts have invoked Hickman mainly
to protect trial strategy or, more vaguely, the attorney's "mental
processes." 20 Although this rationale might explain cases exempt-
ing from discovery certain material that reflects an attorney's
thoughts or strategy,2' it does not explain other cases exempting
15. This distinction was clearly elicited in Hickman. 329 U.S. at 508; of.
Sheperd v. Castle, 20 F.R.D. 184 (W.D. Mo. 1957).
16. 329 U.S. at 508-09.
17. Although the opposing attorneys assumed that the question arose
under Federal Rules 33 and 34, the Court in Hickman properly found that
Federal Rule 26 was in question. 329 U.S. at 501-06.
18. Hickman involved a suit against certain tugboat owners in a federal
court to recover for the death of a seaman. The defendants were asked to
set forth the exact provisions of any oral statements or reports taken of wit-
nesses in detail and to produce copies of all written statements procured. The
defendants and their counsel refused on the ground that this material was
work-product and, therefore, immune from discovery.
19. Good cause is actually a showing of "need" arising because the infor-
mation is probably unavailable from any other source. It is not the sane as
good cause under Federal Rule 34 where convenience is the determinative test;
federal courts are satisfied under Rule 34 where production will enable a
party adequately to prepare his case. See, e.g., United States v. 48 Jars, More
or Less, 23 F.R.D. 192 (D.D.C. 1958); Naylor v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 10 F.R.).
128 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). See also 2A BARmON & HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 652.4 (Rules ed. 1961).
20. See, e.g., Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 24 F.R.D. 493, 499
(M.D.N.C. 1960); Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 269, 270 (1948).
21. See Note, 62 HAnv. L. REv. 269, 270 (1948). See also Louisell, Discov-
ery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINrN. L. REV. 633, 038
(1952):
The Federal Advisory Committee's proposal for a solution of the prob-
lem of Hickman v. Taylor drew a clearcut distinction between those
parts of writings prepared for litigation which do, and those which do
not, reflect an attorney's "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories." The former always were to be exempt from discovery;
material having little or no connection with those factors.22
A less restricted and more proper theory is based on the lan-
guage in Hickman reciting the desirability of promoting the effi-
cacy of the adversary system. -3 Although protection of an attor-
ney's work-product and the goal of avoiding "trial by surprise"
are apparently inconsistent, reconciliation is effected on the
ground of promotion of the adversary system. Further, if the
protection of trial strategy or the privacy of the attorney's files
were the underlying rationale, the good cause exception of Hick-
man would be anomalous; if, instead, the basis of the federal
work-product rule is the promotion of the adversary system, the
good cause exception is not inconsistent. Indeed, this exception
serves to promote an efficient adversary system by providing an
opportunity for full preparation of a case by both counsel where
discoverable information has become otherwise unavailable. This
latter rationale, therefore, is preferable and should control the
scope of protection offered by any rule prohibiting discovery.
Some federal courts have improperly equated experts' con-
clusions with those of an attorney and have therefore held that
an expert's reports are protected as a part of "work-product." ' 4
An expert's conclusions, however, should probably be immune
from discovery in their own right. In so finding, a California court
relied on the attorney-client privilege,25 while many courts, both
the latter were to be exempt unless considerations of fairness, hardship
or justice required discovery.
22. See, e.g., Snyder v. United States, 20 FIJ). 7 (ED).N.Y. 1950) (in-
formation of such a highly technical nature that it could not reflect counsel's
mental processes).
23. 329 U.S. at 516: 'ut a common law trial is and always should be
an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned
profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed
from the adversary." See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAnv. L.
Rzv. 940, 1028 (1961), which suggests that this -broader basis has not yet been
fully articulated in the lower courts.
24. See Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23
FIRD. 257 (D. Neb. 1959). But see Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167
F-2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948). One "evil" that Hickman attempted to obviate, that
the discovery of work-product might make an attorney's conclusions relevant
and might force him to take the stand, does not arise here, for the expert is
properly a witness. The work-product rule, therefore, is not applicable, and if
it were the only argument advanced to justify the expert exemption, it would
be correct to allow discovery since the expert's conclusions are evidence and
should be revealed.
05. See City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d
227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951); cf. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 7 FR). 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
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federal and state, have merely concluded that allowing discovery
would be "unfair. '26 To the extent that discovery would be unfair to
the expert, the rationale is based on an old proprietary argument:
through discovery the interrogating party is taking "property"
from the expert without compensation.m Although this argument
still retains some support," the real unfairness complained of is
more properly directed at the party,20 because discovery penalizes
those who have had the foresight to procure expert assistance.
More broadly stated, therefore, the unfairness rationale is equiva-
lent to the policy that underlies the work-product rule - protec-
tion of expert's conclusions is necessitated by an overriding desire
to effect efficient adversary proceedings."0
III. THE MINNESOTA WORK-PRODUCT RULE
The assumption that Minnesota Rule 26.02 places an absolute
prohibition on discovery of writings that fall within the language
26. See, e.g., Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 188 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Pa. 1900)
(information concerning manufacture and design of a meat grinder readily
available through sources other than opposing counsel); Stanton v. Rushmore,
112 N.J.L. 115, 169 Ati. 721 (1934).
27. See, e.g., Stanton v. Rushmore, 112 NJ.L. 115, 169 At. 721 (1934);
Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Philadelphia,
262 Pa. 439, 105 Atl. 630 (1918).
28. See WRIGHT, MINNESOTA RULES 171 (1954), stating that the purpose
of the prohibition is to prevent one side from obtaining the advantage of
expert testimony without paying for it. See 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
26.24, at 1528 (2d ed. 1953); Louisell, supra note 21, at 639 suggesting that dis-
covery be conditioned on the interrogating party contributing a reasonable share
to the cost of procuring the expert and the expert fees. But see Kratzer v. Min-
neapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts, Inc., Civil No. 537424, 4th Jud. Dist., Minn., Nov.
18, 1959, rejecting such an offer to split costs.
29. Cf. Freidenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Infor-
mation, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455,482 (1962); Louisell, supra note 21.
So. See Freidenthal, supra note 29, at 485-86; cf. E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416, 421 (D. Del. 1959); Comment,
55 Nw. UL. Rnv. 700 (1961). However, some federal courts have argued in
favor of the broad discoverability of expert conclusions on the same basis,
finding that knowledge of possible adverse expert testimony is indispensable
to adequate preparation for cross-examination and, thereby, essential to an
effective adversary proceeding. See United States v. 48 Jars, More or Less,
23 F.R.D. 192, 198 (D.D.C. 1958); cf. Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15
F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954). This argument is especially compelling only in the
rare situation where an expert may distort -his opinion testimony to support
a particular party or position. In such a case the distorted testimony could
not be accurately foreseen, and an effective defense would be unavailable to
a party through other competent witnesses. The Wisconsin court has found
that the importance of avoiding this possible lapse in the adversary system
outweighs any possible "unfairness" to a litigant resulting from the discovery
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of the provision is undoubtedly correct, 1 thus, there can be no
good cause exception to written work-product in Minnesota. This
conclusion is buttressed by the fact that although the proposals
of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee apparently served as
a guideline for the Minnesota rulem the good cause exception in
the proposals was not included in the Mfinnesota provision;
if a good cause exception was intended to be the basis for
discovery of written work-product in Minnesota, it probably
would have been expressly included. The mandatory language of
Rule 26.02, therefore, should not be abrogated by judicial impo-
sition of the Hickman good cause test on written work-product.
A. NoNwmim WoZx-PIIoDucT
Oral statements, however, taken in anticipation of litigation
or reflecting an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opin-
ions or legal theories- work-product not specifically mentioned
in Rule 26.02 - might not be subject to a total prohibition.P The
extent of allowable discovery of oral statements could conceivably
of expert conclusions. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Circuit Court, 15 Wis. 2d 311,
112 N.W.2d 686 (1961); see Comment, 45 MARQ. L. Rnv. 600 (1962). The
argument, however, ignores the obvious strategy of protecting rebuttal testi-
mony until trial; in fact, rather than eliminating surprise the discoverability
of expert conclusions would only shift the advantage of such testimony from
one party to the other. Since, therefore, little would be accomplished by al-
lowing such discovery, the policies in favor of nondiscoverability should re-
main unaffected.
31. See Brown v. Saint Paul City BLy., 241 .mn. 15, 35, 62 N.W.2d 688,
701 (1954). See also Note, 68 H1nv. L. REv. 673, 681 (1955).
32. See FEDERAL ADvIsoRY Coxcsaiuu, 1946 PnoposED A wE xxmETs 83
(Rule 30(b)) (1947):
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing
obtained or prepared by the adverse .party, his attorney, surety, indem-
nitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial
unless satisfied that denial of productiom or inspection will unfairly
prejudce the party seeking the production or inspection in preparing
hit claim or defense or will cause him undue hardship or injustice. The
court shall not order the production or inspection of any part of the
writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35, the con-
clusions of an expert.
(Emphasis added.) For a discussion of the Advisory Committee's amendment,
see Louiseli, supra note 21, at 636-38; Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations
in the Federal Courts 50 CoLum. L. 1Ev. 1026, 1030-31 (1950).
33. See 2 YOuNGQUIST & BLACIE, MllmESoTA Riurs Pa IAcTic (Supp. 1962,
at 8). It probably does not follow, ,however, that work-product can be dis-
covered in Minnesota from the attorney on the basis -that it is only "fact."
See In re Prudence-Bonds Corp., 76 F. Supp. 643 (EBD.N.Y. 1948) (advice
and opinion of counsel cannot be discovered as fact).
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be governed by either of two alternatives: the absolute prohibi-
tion of Rule 26.02 or the Hickman rule. 4 Application of the more
discretionary Hickman rule rather than the unwavering prohibi-
tion of Rule 26.02 to oral work-product would permit results
more consistent with the general goal of maximizing the avail-
ability of relevant factual information without injury to the ad-
versary system through discovery. Any discovery of oral work-
product, however, could result in the evils Hickman attempted to
preclude and culminate in the attorney either being deposed or
testifying against his client's interest. Because of these undesir-
able effects, the production of oral work-product might be com-
pelled very rarely, 5 thus realistically making the good cause
exception to a Hickman-type rule of nondiscoverability of oral
work-product but one step removed from an absolute prohibi-
tion.86 Yet, at least in those cases where justice requires the pro-
duction of the contents of oral statements, the application of
the Hickman rule would permit such discovery at the court's
discretion.
Whether this protection ought to be extended to those persons
other than attorneys enumerated in Rule 26.02,"7 however, is
another question. When oral work-product does not involve di-
rect contact with an attorney, the need for protection is not as
great. Although there should be some concern for misuse of dis-
covery in these cases, most abuses can be thwarted through the
use of Minnesota Rule 30.02. The orders for the protection of
parties and witnesses that are available under Rule 30.02 are
expressly made applicable to the inquiries allowable under Rule
34. Discovery of oral work-product without limitation, another obvious
alternative, should not be permitted, for this would encourage the very "in-
efficiency, unfairness and sharp practices" that the Supreme Court in Hick-
man attempted to preclude:
Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop
in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial.
The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the in-
terests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.
329 U.S. at 511.
35. The Court in Hickman pointed out:
We do not believe that any showing of necessity can be made under
the circumstances of this case so as to justify production [of oral state-
ments]. Under ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or
write out all that witnesses have told 'him and to deliver the account
to his adversary gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrust-
worthiness.... The standards of the profession would thereby suffer.
329 U.S. at 512-13.
36. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
37. See note 7 spra.
NOTE
26.02. Rule 30.02 states that a court may, on a showing of "good
cause," issue an order limiting the scope of the deposition process
or "make any other order which justice requires to protect the
party or witness from annoyance, expense, embarrassment or op-
pression" as Therefore, any threatened detriment to the adversary
system can be checked at the discretion of the court. 9 Since the
federal work-product rule does not extend to all persons enumer-
ated in Rule 26.02, a strict imposition of Hickman would necessi-
tate the use of Rule 30.02 orders to protect work performed by
such persons. An attorney might be examined under a Hickman-
type rule implied in Mrinnesota Rule 26.02 only on a showing of
good cause by his adversary, while discovery by deposition of a
surety, indemnitor or agent would be permissible unless that indi-
vidual could establish good cause to prohibit discovery. Since
protection of the attorney is the main concern, this shift in the
burden of persuasion would be desirable.
Another crucial question in determining the scope of the work-
product restriction is whether material, neither oral nor written,
is subject to discovery where it undeniably reflects both an at-
torney's "mental processes" and was prepared in anticipation of
litigation. Fear has been expressed by members of the Minnesota
Bar that "writing" might be defined so broadly that it would
prohibit the discovery of materials such as movies and photo-
graphs40 that were previously subject to inspection. Presumably,
photographs and movies are mechanical reproductions not suffi-
ciently like a "writing" to be accorded Rule 26.02 protection. If
"mental processes" are reflected by them, it is probably only
38. M N. R. Civ. P. 30.02 reads as follows:
After notice is served for taking a deposition ... the court ... may
make an order that -the deposition shall not be taken... or that cer-
tain matters may not be inquired into . .. or, that secret processes,
developments, or research need not -be disclosed . . . or the court may
make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or
witness from annoyance, expense, embarrassment or oppression. The
power of the court under this rule shall be exercised with liberality
toward the accomplishment of its purpose to protect parties and
witnesses.
89. It is worthy of note that the Federal Advisory Committee's proposed
amendment to the federal rules was contained as an amendment to Rule
30(b), not Rile 26 (b). See note 82 supra.
40. See de Parcq, The Uniform Rules of Evidence: A Plaintijf's View, 40
Mncr. L. RLy. 301, 306-07 (1956). The writer expresses a fear that since
U1ionoM Ruix OF EvmEca 1(13), gives "writing" a sufficiently broad defi-
nition to include plats, x-rays and photographs, the same -broad definition
might be incorporated into Rule 26.02. See Rybak v. minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., Mfln. Rules Comm'n Op. No. 129. But see Williams v. Chicago,
1964]
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because the photograph was taken in such a way that it conveys
an inaccurate representation. Thus, the policy against encourag-
ing "sharp practices" would also favor discoverability. On the
other hand, although a tape recorded statement is technically
no more a "writing" than a photograph, in those cases where it
represents only an alternate means of taking a written statement,
it should be protected. If the term "writing" is narrowly con-
strued, the discretion invested in the court by Rule 30.02 will be
enhanced, and even a photograph might be protected if the exi-
gencies of a particular fact situation demanded it. Consequently,
any mechanistic approach based on the physical characteristics
of the desired items should be avoided. Rather, the scope of pro-
tection of such items should turn on whether, in the view of the
court, protection from discovery would encourage the "sharp
practices" condemned in the Hickman case or would be detri-
mental to an effective adversary proceeding in any other fashion.
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THM MNNESOTA RULE
In Boldt v. Sanders the Minnesota Supreme Court impliedly
considered whether impeachment material was work-product and
therefore outside the scope of discovery.41 The court held that it
was not.' Undoubtedly, the policy supporting discovery clearly
favors the uncovering of possible impeachment material to facili-
tate the elimination of that potential element of gamesmanship
from the trial.43 Although the holding in Boldt might seem to run
afoul of the provisions of Rule 26.02, impeachment material should
be excluded from the protection of that rule, for impeachment
material by itself is not the kind of "defense" material protected
G.W. Ry., Mlnn. Rules Comm'n Op. No. 212, holding that photographs were
not "writings" within the meaning of Rule 26.02 and that the defendant did
not .have to answer interrogatories inquiring about them. This decision seems
to be entirely inconsistent with other decisions and to ignore the fact that Rule
26.02 protects only documents and not the information contained within
them. Cf. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lauritzen, 182 F.2d 540 (6th Cir.
1950); Helverson v. J. J. Newberry Co., 16 F.R.D. 830 (W.D. Mo. 1954);
Shields v. Sobelman, 64 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
41. 261 Minn. 160, 111 N.W.2d 225 (1961), 47 MiN. L. Rav. 289 (1902).
42. 261 Minn. at 164, 111 N.W.2d at 227-28. The court believed that a
refusal to allow discovery would undermine "the whole purpose of the rules
of civil procedure" and "would inevitably lead back to the 'poker hand' con-
cept of litigation, rewarding artifice and camouflage," and found, therefore,
that the adversary system would be benefited 'by broad discoverability of
impeachment material.
43. See Coyne v. Monongahela Connecting R.R., 24 FRD. 357 (W.D.
Pa. 1959); Chandler, Discovery and Pre-Trial Procedure in Federal Courts,
12 OLA. L. Rav. 321, 324 (1959).
NOTE
by Rule 26.02.M " The Boldt decision, therefore, merely extends the
scope of discovery beyond inquiries designed to lead to evidence;45
it only allows discovery of impeachment material that is not
otherwise protected. As such, the decision is consistent with a
policy of enhancing an open, effective adversary proceeding. Boldt
does not, however, stand for the proposition that a writing, other-
wise undiscoverable because of Rule 26.02, is discoverable if it
is impeachment material. Clearly, anything that is a "writing"
within the meaning of Rule 26.02, including impeachment mate-
rial, if prepared in anticipation of trial or reflecting an attorney's
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories is en-
titled to immunity.46
The Minnesota court has also considered whether a statement
taken in the usual course of business that serves purposes other
than trial preparation is to be protected from discovery. In Brown
v. Saint Paul City Ry.4' the court held that unless the material
is prepared solely in anticipation of litigation, it is subject to dis-
covery. Since Rule 26.02 explicitly applies to materials prepared
not only by an attorney, but by the party, his agent, surety or
indemnitor, such materials might conceivably be prepared both
as a matter of business policy and in anticipation of litigation.
Notwithstanding that these materials might appear to be pro-
tected by the language of the rule, they are probably within the
"usual course of business" exception and are available for discovery
purposes. Thus, in Brown, a report prepared pursuant to an es-
tablished routine was denied the protection of Rule 26.02 because
there was no evidence that it was not to be used for purposes
other than preparing for litigation. However, proof that a writing
was prepared by one of the persons enumerated in Rule 26.02
solely in anticipation of litigation - although perhaps in the usual
course of business- might avoid the Brown decision and allow
such material to remain protected.
The Iinnesota work-product rule, then, is not as stringent as
it might appear on its face. It does, however, represent a greater
intrusion into the-policy of maximized discovery than the federal
44. See defenses enumerated in MiN. R. Civ. P. 8.03.
45. See note 7 supra.
46. As previously stated, the question whether or not mental processes are
involved should seldom be determinative, but the requirement that the state-
ment be taken in anticipation of litigation is a strictly construed prerequisite
to Rule 26.02 protection. Thus, when an attorney's activities are undertaken
for the primary purpose of planning future conduct-as is often the case
with house counsel-the work is not -protected as work-product under Rule
26.02.
47. 241 '_nn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954).
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rule- primarily because of its failure to provide a good cause
exception when applied to writings.
IV. THE NONDISCOVERABILITY OF THE
CONCLUSIONS OF AN EXPERT
The similarity of the expert exemption and the work-product
rule in both rationale and result has led to many similar interpre-
tive developments. Thus, the majority of federal courts have al-
lowed discovery of possible adverse expert conclusions on a show-
ing of "good cause. '48 Like the Minnesota rule on work-product,
however, Rule 26.02 has expressed an absolute prohibition by
providing that except for the findings of a medical examination
ordered under Rule 35, "the conclusions of an expert, shall not
be required."
A. EXTENT OF THE MINNESOTA RuLE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
A distinction has been drawn between "facts" observed by an
expert held to be discoverable and "conclusions" resulting from
these observations held to be protected.49 Since Rule 26.02 does
not purport to cover "facts," any material that is not a "conclu-
sion" of an expert might be either freely discoverable, absolutely
nondiscoverable by the express prohibition of Rule 26.02, or, under
the Hickman test, discoverable on a showing of good cause. The
distinction between conclusions and facts logically results in the
rule that whenever an expert witness is called upon to divulge
information that could be characterized either as a fact or a con-
clusion, discovery should be prohibited if the witness is familiar
with the material solely because of his expertise. In some respects
the whole fact-conclusion distinction is open to doubt, because
where factual discovery amounts to discovery of an ultimate con-
48. See, e.g., United States v. Nysco Labs., Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159 (E.D.N.Y.
1960).
49. Rosenow v. Macklin, Minn. Rules Comm'n Op. No. 36, 12th Jud. Dist.,
1952. The court in Rosenow refused to permit interrogation of a doctor de-
fendant where the answer would require expertise, although the defendant
was required to answer questions calling for a factual reply. In Kratzer v.
Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts, Inc., Civil No. 537424, 4th Jud. Dist., Minn.,
Nov. 18, 1959, the court decided that a deposition could not be taken of de-
fendant's expert in an attempt to discover -his opinion, ,but allowed factual
discovery on a showing of good cause, stating: "It is the court's conclusion
that -the weighing of interests and of factors of fairness under the facts
claimed by the plaintiff justify the granting of his motion for the purpose, not
of inquiring of Dr. Middeldorf as to his expert opinion, but of inquiring as
to facts known -by him upon which an opinion might be based."
elusion or opinion,50 or where facts and conclusions are so inter-
twined as to be inseparable, Rule 26.02 would seem to demand
complete protection. Yet, by allowing some discovery under the
fact-conclusion distinction on a showing of good cause- the
Hickman rule applied to the discovery of purely "facts" - much
of the harshness of an otherwise absolute prohibition of conclu-
sions would be alleviated.
Rule 26.02 could be interpreted to accord protection only to
written expert conclusions while permitting their discovery by
deposition or interrogatory.51 It might be argued, therefore, that
the absolute prohibition is inapplicable to nonwritten conclusions,
and discovery by deposition, under a Hickman-type rule, would be
permitted on a showing of good cause as in the case of an oral work
product.5 2 Rule 26.02, however, explicitly refers to written work-
50. What is a "conclusion" or an "ultimate conclusion" can be almost
incapable of definition. Cf. Dixon v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 797
(W.D. La. 1939) (abolishes the distinction between discovery of "evidentiary"
facts and "ultimate or material" facts). The federal courts have occasionally
allowed discovery, however, of conclusions when they assume the nature of
"ultimate facts," e.g., E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959), or because there is no other way for the
plaintiff to prove his case, e.g., United States v. Nysco Labs., Inc., 26 F.lUD.
159 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). See also Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the
New Federal Rules, 15 TEwN. L. REv. 737 (1939).
Because of the confusion that can arise, it would seem that factual dis-
covery should be allowed only on a showing of good cause. See Kratzer v.
Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts, Inc., Civil No. 537424, 4th Jud. Dist., Minn.,
Nov. 18, 1959; Cf. 2 YOUNGQUIST & BLc-, MiNNmsOTA RULES PAcncC
(Supp. 1962, at 8), indicating that oral depositions of experts should be al-
lowed in Minnesota on a showing of good cause.
51. This distinction is justified by finding that the exemption covers only
documents, the actual prepared report, while conclusions contained in that
report are not exempt. Ilinmois has apparently applied its exemptive provision,
hIr. Rxv. STAT. ch. 110, § 10119--5 (1956) only to writings. See, e.g., Krupp
v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 11. 2d 37, 42, 132 N .E-d 532, 536 (1950). See
also Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 12-14, 245 P.2d 224, 230 (1952), where
the distinction was discussed. Louisiana apparently 'has limited the prohibi-
tion only to writings and permits discovery by deposition or interrogatory.
See LA. Civ. CODE AyN. art. 1452 (West 1960); Hubert, The New Louisiana
Statute on Depositions and Discovery, 13 LA. L. REV. 173, 193-94 (1953).
Texas and Pennsylvania -have cleared up the potential problem by using the
term expert "information" rather than "writings." See PA. R. Civ. P. 4011(d);
cf. Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.01(b). The use of the word "conclusions" in Mm-. R.
Civ. P. 26.02 could conceivably have been intended to convey the same broad
meaning. Like Minnesota, Texas, Pennsylvania, Missouri and Illinois have
all eliminated the good cause exception from .their rules. See generally Dis-
covery Procedure Symposium, 5 FID. 403 (1946).
52. The good cause requirement would again be applicable -because the
arguments advanced to justify discovery of oral work-product on a showing
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product; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if only written
conclusions were meant to be protected the provision would spe-
cifically say so.5s Moreover, in Kratzer v. Minneapolis Soo'y of
Fine Arts, IM.,14 the prohibition was applied to an attempted dis-
covery of nonwritten conclusions. Thus, Rule 26.02 would seem-
ingly protect expert conclusions regardless of the means of dis-
covery employed.
B. PossIBLE SPECIAL CAsEs
In Lyngstad v. Zarling,55 a medical malpractice case in a
of good cause apply equally to discovery of expertise by deposition.
See text accompanying note 84 supra. But see Mmw. R. Civ. P. 84, requir-
ing "good cause" for inspection of documents. Although the Rule 84 good
cause requirement, that discovery is advantageous for trial purposes, is not
as severe as the Hickman test, discovery by deposition should probably be
allowed on a Hickman test of necessity rather than the Rule 34 test. Also, if
experts are available to 'both parties, the purpose of an oral deposition would
apparently be only to capitalize on the adverse party's trial preparations.
Thus, depositions should be allowed only when one party has the only avail-
able expert and there is no alternate means of discovering the information.
Cf. Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 244 Minn. 401, 70 N.W.2d 201 (195),
where the defendants did not request discovery of expert conclusions, although
they could have shown good cause. The claim involved damages allegedly
due to application of a certain liniment. Plaintiff's chemist tested the liniment
contained in the bottle in question, but the container was then emptied and
was unavailable to the defendant. See a comment on this case by Wright,
Recent Trends in the Practical Use of Discovery, 16 NACCA L.J. 409, 415
(1955).
2 YOUNGQUIST & BLAc x, MLNNESOTA Ruixs PRACTICE (Supp. 1902, at 8)
suggests that depositions be allowed and controlled by the good cause rule,
citing, to this effect, American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods., Co.,
28 F.R.D. 680 (D.RI. 1959); Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 370
(D.N.J. 1954); Colden v. R. J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio
1952). However, since no good cause provision exists in Minnesota, there
would seem to be no reason for allowing an imposition of the good cause
exception, even if desirable, by the imperfect distinction between oral and
written conclusions.
53. See note 7 supra. The wording of the statute is rather confusing. Ar-
guably, "conclusions" could be modified by "writings" used earlier in the
rule and the work-product and expert exemption should be considered in
pari materia. But see reference to Texas, Missouri and Pennsylvania rules
note 51 supra.
54. Civil No. 539424, 4th Jud. Dist., Minn., Nov. 18, 1959; see note 49
supra. Indeed, the court faced the issue of interpretation directly and found
that only work-product had to be written, stating: "The court reads the sen-
tence with reference to the instant case as meaning that, in the taking of a
deposition of the witness of an adverse party, one may not, over objection,
require an expert of the adverse party to state his conclusions." (Emphasis
added.)
55. Civil No. 561925, 4th Jud. Dist., Minn., Nov. 16, 1960.
NOTE
Minnesota district court created a narrow exception to Rule 26.02,
for the defendant doctor was required to divulge his conclusions
and opinions forming the basis of his treatment. The court in
reaching that determination considered the peculiar nature of a
malpractice case and pointed out that in such a case the defend-
ants diagnosis was necessary evidence in the plaintiff's case. The
Lyngstad case is unique because the expert was also the party
defendant. Therefore, it does not represent authority for the
proposition that medical expert opinions or conclusions are sub-
ject to discovery in every case. Indeed, the court examined the
issue only in terms of the defendant-expert, and, more particu-
larly, the malpractice case. 6 The court in Lyngstad did prohibit
inquiries as to conclusions formed by the defendant subsequent
to the alleged negligent treatment, but on the questionable ground
that they would constitute an "unreasonable annoyance to the
defendant within the meaning of Rule 30.02."'
A better result could be obtained by using a Hickman analysis
rather than Rule 30.02. Since Rule 26.02, as interpreted in Lyng-
stac, does not protect the conclusions of an expert-defendant in
a malpractice case, Hickman should control and good cause could
be shown to permit discovery of conclusions relevant to the al-
leged negligent act. Although expert conclusions as to subsequent
treatment might ordinarily be established by other expert wit-
nesses, it might be possible for one party to tie up all available
experts in a community. If the Hickman rationale were used, good
cause might be shown to permit discovery, while the blanket pro-
hibition of Lyngstad based on Rule 80.02 would seemingly apply
to all conclusions formed after the alleged negligent act.
Some federal courts have held that the rule limiting discovery
should be applied narrowly to protect only experts engaged by
a party specifically for the purpose of the impending litigation.P
Thus, the conclusions of court-appointed experts and experts who
56. See Civil No. 561925, 4th Jud. Dist., Minn., Nov. 16, 1960, p. X-3.
57. Id. at M-4. The court was concerned with lengthy hypothetical ques-
tions being propounded to the defendant doctor resulting in harrassment that
would result in either frequent hearings on the propriety of the questions or
a referee sitting in on the deposition process. Of. Beirne v. Fitch Sanitarium,
Inc., 20 F.R.D. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Hunder v. Rindlaub, 01 N.D. 389, 237
N.W. 915 (1931). Procuring a Rule 30.02 order may not, however, be to the
liking of a harrassed deponent. See Developments in the Law Discovery, 74
Hsnv. L. 11Ev. 940, 983 (1961).
58. See, e.g., Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594,
596 (WI). Pa. 1947): "Where an individual is an expert in a given field, and,
therefore, qualified to submit an opinion, [he may be examined and asked]
why certain things were done or not done by [him] where said person is ...
employed regularly by the adverse party ... " See also Russo v. Merck
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are concurrently permanent employees of a party to the action
would be subject to discovery. The employee-expert, however,
presents a situation analogous to malpractice cases, in which strict
adherence to a policy promoting an efficient adversary system
would preclude discovery of the conclusions of the employee-
expert formed subsequent to the act giving rise to the litigation,
reports issued at the request of an attorney, or other conclusions
prepared in anticipation of litigation.0 But discovery ought to be
permitted where the party is unable to prepare his case ade-
quately without the conclusions of the employee-expert or where
his adversary has a virtual monopoly on the experts in the com-
munity" - a Hickman-type rule.
While there are situations in which the conclusions of an expert
are discoverable under Rule 26.02, courts should be wary of creat-
ing exceptions to the extent that the rationale for permitting dis-
covery is no longer applicable. In Luger v. Linner,01 for instance,
a Minnesota district court in another malpractice case went be-
yond Lyngstad and ordered production not only of the diagnosis
prior to the alleged malpractice, but also opinion testimony about
the knowledge of other physicians in the community and the tech-
niques and practices employed by them. 2 The court reasoned
that such knowledge is "an integral part of a physician's work
in connection with the care and treatment of a particular pa-
& Co., Inc., 21 FAD. 237 (D.R.I. 1957); Kendall v. United Air Lines, ic.,
9 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
59. A further complication arises in that reports by an employee-expert
could conceivably be privileged. See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as
Applied to Co;!porations, 65 YALE LJ. 953, 958-66 (1956); of. Schmitt v.
Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942). The report might also be found
to be work-product. These determinations turn on the interpretation of the
word "agent" in Rule 26.02 and the extent to which the attorney-client privi-
lege covers communications by a party's employee or agent. Although Brown
v. Saint Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954) might eliminate
the possibility of these contentions, the difficulty inhering in an attempt to
discover the expert conclusions of an employee could be thrice compounded.
60. Cf. Kratzer v. Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts, Inc., Civil No. 537424,
4th Jud. Dist., Minn., Nov. 18, 1959, where plaintiff asserted that the expert
whose deposition he wished was not the only authority, but that authorities
were few and that all of them were employed by the defendant.
61. Civil No. 554251, 4th Jud. Dist., Minn., March 25, 1963.
62. The defendant was asked on cross-examination whether "according
to medical standards a general practitioner is supposed to know what a frac-
ture is, is he." An objection interposed to the question as calling for a medical
opinion was sustained. A new trial was ordered by the court, however, on
the ground that this evidence should properly have been received. Although
the question arose under Rule 43.02 relating to cross-examination rather than
on deposition, the -basic considerations are the same.
tient. '63 The result reached in Linner, therefore, allowed exam-
ination of the defendant-expert as an expert per se. In doing so
the court exceeded the bounds of any permissible exception to the
prohibition expressed by Rule 26.02 or even to the Hickman
rule because other experts could have provided this information.
CONCLUSION
The future of the work-product exclusionary clause of Rule
26.02 depends on the use made of Rule 30.02 protective orders,
the scope of the usual course of business exception, and the
breadth of the definition given "writings," as well as the appli-
cability of a Hickman-type "good cause" exception. Conceivably,
the rule could be severely limited by judicially created exceptions.
Nonetheless, certain material, such as written statements of wit-
nesses taken by an attorney, clearly cannot be compelled. With
controversial, borderline material, however, the trend seems to
be toward broad discoverability, in accordance with federal pro-
cedure under Hickman. Such a development is desirable if it does
not violate express provisions of Rule 26.02, because protection
may be afforded by both the Hickman good cause exception and
the discretionary Rule 30.02.
Judicially created exceptions have been even more common
with respect to the rule protecting the conclusions of an expert.
The expert does not share the peculiar position of an attorney
as an -advocate in an adversary proceeding. Therefore, these ex-
ceptions are perhaps justified as a means of maximizing discovery
without detriment to the adversary system. Because of the dis-
cretionary powers given to the courts under Rule 30.02, the pro-
tection given expert conclusions could, perhaps justifiably, be
all but eliminated by a determination that while written reports
are protected, an oral deposition may be taken of an adverse
party's expert on a showing of good cause. 4
63. Civil No. 554251, 4th Jud. Dist., Aim., March 25, 1963, at 2.
64. Cf. YouNGQuisT & Biacix, 2 M sNMOTA RULEs PRACrCE (Supp. 1062,
at 8).
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